Renard Sexton

 Book Project: “Weapons of the Weak Nation”

The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s ushered in a period where major interstate war seemed to recede as a major threat around the world. With only one military superpower, the United States, policymakers and scholars turned their focus to civil wars, peacekeeping, and (after the 9/11 attacks in the United States) international terrorism.

This began to change in the early 2010s as China’s new President Xi Jinping took advantage of a modernized military to act more assertively in east and southeast Asia, occupying large swathes of the disputed Spratly islands and harassing ships from neighboring countries. In early 2014, Russia’s leadership chose to forcibly annex Crimea from Ukraine during a political crisis in Kyiv, followed by a sustained campaign to control parts of Ukraine’s east. This presaged what came in 2022: a full-scale invasion aimed at toppling Ukraine’s government and controlling, if not formally annexing, the country. The timing of this latest crisis coincided with Beijing’s major crackdown on autonomy in Hong Kong, following widespread protests in 2019, and a rising level of saber-rattling and threats against Taiwan, another disputed territory.[1] Great power competition and interstate war was decidedly back on the agenda.

Countries with weak militaries have looked on with growing concern as this new paradigm has sparked a weapons-building race among the tiny club of the well-armed. More than three quarters of global military expenditures is done by just ten countries[2] and these nations are spending more than ever. The U.S., China, the U.K., Germany, France, Japan and (more than anyone) Russia have publicized big boosts to their defense budget in the last three years.

In contrast, most of the 195-odd nations around the world have paltry military budgets that are barely able to even secure their borders. Indonesia, a nation of 275 million people that fashions itself a leader in Southeast Asia had a 2023 military budget of $8.8 billion, about 100 times smaller than the U.S. defense budget of $886. The Philippines (114 million people), a U.S. treaty ally who tangles regularly with China in the disputed South China Sea, had a 2023 defense budget of about $4 billion, less than what the U.S. is spending on a single air platform in 2023 (the B-21 bomber, worth $5 billion in FY 2023). For many nations the numbers are even smaller: Guatemala spends just $300 to $400 million per year on its military, Sierra Leone is reported to have spent $25 million.

Having a weak military (often paired with a price-taking economy) means that political leaders are constrained on the global stage when foreign policy crises crop up. This is particularly worrisome when a powerful neighbor wants territory or access to resources you think is yours. Until recently, the post-WWII institutions of strong sovereignty, the UN security council, and deterrence from the United States and its allies have been good enough to keep irredentist conflicts to a minimum. But as the global order of the post-Cold War era slides further into the rearview mirror, more and more weak nations are facing down claims and threats from which the international architecture cannot protect them.

This book documents a set of political strategies and foreign policy maneuvers employed by weak nations in the face of neighbors with growing military power and ambition. The must balance a complex set of interests, delusions and facts: most populaces are deeply unbending about territorial disputes, even if they acknowledge they do not have the military, diplomatic or economic strength to prevail. Instead, leaders must satisfy nationalistic publics without provoking war or cutting off valuable economic exchange, including trade and investment.

The majority of the book focuses on East and Southeast Asia in the face of China’s growing military power and regional expansionist tendencies. Its examines conflict trends in the South China Sea and the associated domestic politics in ASEAN countries leveraging more than 12 years of original geo-coded event data, three waves of nationally representative surveys across numerous countries, hundreds of original surveys of fisherman, and dozens of interviews of policymakers. Although Asia is the focus, the book also looks at Russia’s irredentist claims in Europe, and makes some historical comparisons to rising regional powers, such as the United States in the late 19th century.

The title of this project is inspired by James Scott’s legendary book “Weapons of the Weak,” which documents the many small ways that marginalized peasants resist a growing state apparatus. The book puts a few twists on the concept by turning it to the international relations realm by showing how leaders must both manage outwards towards adversaries, friends and rivals and inward towards interest groups, ideological segments and, especially, nationalists. Even from a position of weakness, there are techniques they can use to arrest, if not ultimately prevent, regional powers from exerting their will.

[1] Meanwhile, border crises and cross-border violence has been on the rise: Armenia and Azerbaijan; Israel and Lebanon; Turkey and Syria; DR Congo and Rwanda; Afghanistan and Pakistan, among others.

[2] As of 2024, in descending order the top spenders are the U.S., China, Russia, India, U.K., Saudi Arabia, Germany, France, Japan and South Korea.